In the “Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023,” Section 3 (1) establishes a fundamental principle that every definition of an offence, every penal provision, and every illustration related to these definitions or provisions should be interpreted in accordance with the exceptions outlined in the Chapter titled “General Exceptions,” even if these exceptions are not reiterated in the specific definitions, penal provisions, or illustrations. The Sanhita provides two illustrations to clarify this principle: firstly, that certain sections in the Sanhita, while not explicitly stating that a child under seven years cannot commit certain offences, should be understood within the context of the general exception that exempts such young children from criminal liability; secondly, it highlights that an act performed by a police officer without a warrant, like apprehending a murderer, is not wrongful confinement, as the officer is obligated by law to perform such an act.
Additionally, the Sanhita’s Section 3 (2) ensures that expressions explained in any part of the Sanhita are used consistently throughout. Section 3 (3) clarifies that when property is held by one’s spouse, clerk, or servant on the person’s behalf, it is deemed to be in that person’s possession within the Sanhita’s context. It further explains that a person temporarily employed or engaged in a specific role as a clerk or servant should also be considered as such under this sub-section.
Moreover, the Sanhita’s Section 3 (4) specifies that words referring to acts extend to illegal omissions across all sections of the Sanhita, except when the context indicates otherwise. In line with this, Section 3 (5) details that when a criminal act is committed by multiple individuals in alignment with a common intention, each participant is equally liable for that act, as if they had performed it individually. Similarly, Section 3 (6) extends this principle to acts that are criminal solely due to the criminal knowledge or intent involved. In such cases, every individual contributing to the act with such knowledge or intent is held accountable as if they had committed the act alone with the same intention.
Furthermore, Section 3 (7) clarifies that if an offence involves causing an effect or an attempt to cause that effect by an act or an omission, the combination of causing the effect partly through an act and partly through an omission constitutes the same offence. An illustration accompanying this section highlights the scenario where causing a person’s death involves both the act of intentionally not providing food and physically beating them.
Lastly, Section 3 (8) addresses offences committed through multiple acts. It stipulates that any individual who intentionally assists in committing such an offence by performing any of those acts, either alone or jointly with another person, is considered to have committed that offence. It provides examples to elucidate this, including instances where individuals collaborate to administer poison with the intent to murder, or where joint jailers are complicit in causing a prisoner’s death through the unlawful omission of providing food.
Section 3 (9) acknowledges that in cases where multiple individuals are involved in the commission of a criminal act, they may be held responsible for different offences resulting from that act. An illustration illustrates this principle by illustrating the situation where an individual aids in killing another under circumstances of grave provocation, resulting in different levels of criminal culpability for each participant.
| Sections of IPC | Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita |
| Section 34: Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention | (5) When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone. Illustrations. (a) A and B agree to murder Z by severally and at different times giving him small doses of poison. A and B administer the poison according to the agreement with intent to murder Z. Z dies from the effects the several doses of poison so administered to him. Here A and B intentionally cooperate in the commission of murder and as each of them does an act by which the death is caused, they are both guilty of the offence though their acts are separate. (b) A and B are joint jailors, and as such have the charge of Z, a prisoner, alternatively for six hours at a time. A and B, intending to cause Z’s death, knowingly co-operate in causing that effect by illegally omitting, each during the time of his attendance, to furnish Z with food supplied to them for that purpose. Z dies of hunger. Both A and B are guilty of the murder of Z. (c) A, a jailor, has the charge of Z, a prisoner. A, intending to cause Z’s death, illegally omits to supply Z with food; in consequence of which Z is much reduced in strength, but the starvation is not sufficient to cause his death. A is dismissed from his office, and B succeeds him. B, without collusion or co-operation with A, illegally omits to supply Z with food, knowing that he is likely thereby to cause Z’s death. Z dies of hunger. B is guilty of murder, but, as A did not co-operate with B. A is guilty only of an attempt to commit murder. |
| Section 35: When such an act is criminal by reason of its being done with a criminal knowledge or intention | (6) Whenever an act, which is criminal only by reason of its being done with a criminal knowledge or intention, is done by several persons, each of such persons who joins in the act with such knowledge or intention is liable for the act in the same manner as if the act were done by him alone with that knowledge or intention. |
| Section 36: Effect caused partly by act and partly by omission | (7) Wherever the causing of a certain effect, or an attempt to cause that effect, by an act or by an omission, is an offence, it is to be understood that the causing of that effect partly by an act and partly by an omission is the same offence. Illustration. A intentionally causes Z’s death, partly by illegally omitting to give Z food, and partly by beating Z. A has committed murder. |
| Section 37: Co-operation by doing one of several acts constituting an offence | (8) When an offence is committed by means of several acts, whoever intentionally co-operates in the commission of that offence by doing any one of those acts, either singly or jointly with any other person, commits that offence. Illustrations. (a) A and B agree to murder Z by severally and at different times giving him small doses of poison. A and B administer the poison according to the agreement with intent to murder Z. Z dies from the effects the several doses of poison so administered to him. Here A and B intentionally cooperate in the commission of murder and as each of them does an act by which the death is caused, they are both guilty of the offence though their acts are separate. (b) A and B are joint jailors, and as such have the charge of Z, a prisoner, alternatively for six hours at a time. A and B, intending to cause Z’s death, knowingly co-operate in causing that effect by illegally omitting, each during the time of his attendance, to furnish Z with food supplied to them for that purpose. Z dies of hunger. Both A and B are guilty of the murder of Z. (c) A, a jailor, has the charge of Z, a prisoner. A, intending to cause Z’s death, illegally omits to supply Z with food; in consequence of which Z is much reduced in strength, but the starvation is not sufficient to cause his death. A is dismissed from his office, and B succeeds him. B, without collusion or co-operation with A, illegally omits to supply Z with food, knowing that he is likely thereby to cause Z’s death. Z dies of hunger. B is guilty of murder, but, as A did not co-operate with B. A is guilty only of an attempt to commit murder. |
| Section 38: Persons concerned in criminal act may be guilty of different offences by means of that act | (9) Where several persons are engaged or concerned in the commission of a criminal act, they may be guilty of different offences by means of that act. Illustration. A attacks Z under such circumstances of grave provocation that his killing of Z would be only culpable homicide not amounting to murder. B, having ill-will towards Z and intending to kill him, and not having been subject to the provocation, assists A in killing Z. Here, though A and B are both engaged in causing Z’s death, B is guilty of murder, and A is guilty only of culpable homicide. |